A Lebanese politician who recently returned from a visit to Damascus told Al-Monitor that the Syrian presidential elections scheduled for June 3 have become almost the sole concern of officials there. According to this source, the elections are the only thing Syrian leaders are talking about, and their only interest is in the results.
Of course, this doesn't mean the actual results of the vote, because it appears to be a foregone conclusion that the mandate of President Bashar al-Assad will be renewed. Rather, they are concerned about the political and diplomatic impact on the course of events: How will external parties deal with the reality that emerges? What will Westerners do when it is confirmed that their adversary, Assad, will remain in power, in a legal and legitimate manner? How will the Geneva conference mechanism continue or end?
The Lebanese source also reported that senior Syrian officials in the meantime are focusing on developments on the ground and the series of local and partial settlements entered into with armed opposition units in a number of regions under the rubric of "reconciliation." He noted that a new model had appeared in recent days that consists of a mixture of two parts as happened in Homs, where the regime imposed total control over the city, considered the "capital of the revolution," and reached a quasi-settlement that allowed both sides to avoid a brutal battle in the last besieged neighborhoods of Homs’ Old City. This approach has implications for the expected coming battle in the city of Aleppo.
The politician described the situation on the ground as very fragile. He said that the reconciliation was in the very early stages and did not extend beyond cease-fires in the areas where settlements have been reached. The scenario for these reconciliations only requires that the Syrian army agree to a "reconciliation" with an armed opposition group in one or more neighborhoods. After this, steps are taken to end fighting, and then the Syrian authorities guarantee the salaries and logistics of the armed militants under the banner of including them in "national defense committees." Yet, nothing really changes on the ground. This is because, in most cases, it is impossible for the regime's army to enter the areas of the reconciliations, and Syrian state institutions remain absent. The politician noted that small and sporadic clashes had been recorded in areas where reconciliations have occurred, in addition to ongoing chaos and lawlessness.
Based on these observations, as well as on a series of meetings the politician conducted with Syrian officials and activists, the process of reassembling the fabric of the Syrian state and society will be complex, delicate and difficult, he told Al-Monitor: "There are now three distinctive components, some of which are contradictory, but they appear to be coexisting now by virtue of the reality [on the ground]. How can a single regime bring them together in the future? "
The first component is the national defense committees. These are groups of civilians who support the regime. Just months after the start of the rebellion, they volunteered to support the Syrian army. They were armed by the state to carry out military missions in their areas, and they participated in numerous, brutal battles. The politician said that they played a distinct role in resolving some of the confrontations, given the ease with which they could mobilize and move about compared to the regime army's heavy and slow maneuvering. Moreover, these local fighters knew the geography and populace in the areas of confrontations, whereas the members of the regime army sometimes came from distant regions. Thus, members of the national defense committees are under the impression that they are "responsible for victory" and therefore should share in the postwar "harvest" when rebuilding the state. The politician noted that there are nearly 40,000 such volunteers.
The second component is the gunmen who joined the regime via the reconciliation process. These fighters do not consider themselves defeated because they did not lose in battle but ended it through a settlement. They feel that they have done the regime a favor with the "truces" they have entered into with it. If not for these agreements, the regime would have continued in battles of attrition in many locations. Thus, these fighters feel that the regime owes them something and that any process to achieve stability should return the favor by providing them benefits when structuring a new authority.
The third component consists of the basic state apparatuses, including the army and various departments. It includes hundreds of thousands of Syrians who have remained steadfast, standing with the regime for three years. They consider themselves to be the primary reason for the survival of the regime itself. While some people defected, fled, switched from one faction to another or simply hid in their homes, these people stood their ground and thus achieved something. This "triumphal" logic ranges from administrative state employees' feelings of having contributed to the "victory," for example, to soldiers' feelings of being responsible for the victory. Thus, in light of the great risks they took, the threats they faced, and their refusal of the enemy's temptations, the common denominator within this component is that they expect to receive later what they paid for previously. There are, however, many distinctions within the component.
The Syrian scene, therefore, appears to confront a complex process: How to reassemble a puzzle composed of at least three pieces in which each piece has become bigger than it was in the original picture, or from another perspective, how to distribute one prize among three winners, when the prize itself may not even exist. This issue is as difficult as it is crucial. There are certainly some in Damascus who think about this daily, the politician said, even if the time for resolution is still to come. For now, the priority is June 3.
Source/Fuente: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/syria-local-truces-rec...
