Unless there is a sudden and major development in internal or external political positions before May 25, Lebanon will have a presidential vacancy for the third time in its modern history. Repeated attempts to hold a parliamentary session to elect a new president have failed. The term of the current president, Michel Suleiman, expires at midnight on May 24. After leaving the presidential palace, he will be the first Lebanese president to not have directly received the presidency from his predecessor or to have handed it to his successor. Suleiman was elected president on May 25, 2008, after a presidential vacancy that started on Nov. 24, 2007. When he leaves the presidency this weekend, he likely will be leaving a similar presidential vacancy of unknown duration.
It can be said that the Lebanese political system has become used to presidential vacancies and has adapted to them, especially in light of the constitutional amendments approved by the Taif Agreement in Saudi Arabia in 1989. The Taif Agreement made the presidency a secondary post within a quasi-parliamentary system whereby all constitutional institutions can largely continue to function in the absence of a president.
The Lebanese Constitution stipulates that if the presidency becomes vacant, the powers of the president are conveyed to the council of ministers. Note that the presidential powers themselves are not decisive and cannot stop the work of the system. The president can attend meetings of and preside over the council of ministers, but he doesn’t decide its agenda nor vote on its decisions. If he opposes a cabinet decision, he may only request that it be reviewed. If the council of ministers insists on that decision, it will go into effect two weeks after it was approved, whether or not the president agrees.
The same applies to parliament. The constitution gave the president the power to only publish the laws passed by parliament, and if he opposes a law, he may also return it to parliament for reconsideration. Yet, if a parliamentary majority insists on the law, it takes effect in one month at the most, whether or not the president agrees.
Thus, according to the constitution, the Lebanese system can, to a great extent, operate normally without a president. That poses a problem beyond the constitutional text involving the power balance among the sects that make up the Lebanese system. This is called the “national pact” dimension. For example, the parliament speaker must be Shiite and he has significant powers in managing the legislative branch. He has unlimited terms and legislative authority, in a sense. The same applies to the prime minister, who must by custom be Sunni according to how power is distributed to the sects in the Lebanese system.
The prime minister has almost absolute powers in the executive branch, which is represented by the council of ministers in its entirety. The council of ministers cannot operate without the prime minister. The council is considered effectively resigned when the prime minister resigns, and the council cannot meet without the prime minister. Even after he resigns, the prime minister stays on as caretaker prime minister until a new government is formed.
In recent days, some Christians have complained about an imbalance in the government posts of the representatives of the sects in the Lebanese system. Some Christians have even raised the possibility of a constitutional amendment that in cases where a president's term has ended, the president would remain in office in a caretaker capacity until his successor is elected.
Yet, passing such an amendment seems almost impossible. Thus, the various Christian political forces have started considering another option to offset the imbalance. One idea is that Christian ministers, from various sides, would boycott cabinet sessions after the presidency becomes vacant on May 25. Those ministers would be able to deprive council of its constitutional quorum, which is two-thirds of government ministers.
The same idea is being proposed for parliament, where Christian deputies can boycott parliamentary sessions to prevent the legislative authority from continuing to work in the absence of a Christian president. The Christians are trying to apply pressure so that the presidential vacuum doesn’t last long and to speed up the election of a new president. More importantly, they are trying to impose an equation whereby the system cannot continue to work normally when the presidency is vacant so that the idea that the presidency is not really needed doesn’t become consecrated.
However, two matters counter that kind of thinking. First, what if the resulting complete disruption of the system and its institutions results in a situation that imposes a comprehensive review of the constitution? In such a situation and in light of the current power balance, could the Christians guarantee that such an operation would not take place at their expense and that it doesn’t result in their losing even more constitutional powers in the system, as happened every time before?
Second, there are pressing government duties related to the economy, people’s livelihoods and workers' demands that are before the government and parliament, such as the demand for higher wages by state employees and teachers. What if Christian politicians were to be seen as responsible for obstructing the country’s economy and the demands of the needy?
For these and many other reasons, it is likely that Christian politicians will only raise their voices and threaten to paralyze the institutions without fully doing so. The hour of major changes in Lebanon regarding the constitution and the regime has not yet arrived, and everyone is afraid of when it comes. And they are even more afraid of its happening prematurely.
